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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 960149-CA 
KENNETH D. SOUZA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions on six charges: 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony; tampering with 
evidence, a second degree felony; failure to pay drug stamp tax, 
a third degree felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal, 
a third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor; and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to 
compel disclosure of the St. George police department's "hot 
pursuit" policy? 
The trial court's decision to deny a motion to compel 
represents a discretionary ruling, reviewed deferentially on 
appeal. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motions for a mistrial, made: 1) when the court 
permitted Kim Randall, a defense witness, to testify on the first 
day of trial while clothed in prison garb; and 2) when the court 
refused to recall Randall after determining, through a proffer, 
that further testimony from him on the second day of trial would 
be cumulative and repetitive? 
A reviewing court gives a trial court a "great deal" of 
discretion when it denies a motion for a mistrial. State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d at 938; accord State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d 1377, 
13 81 (Utah App. 1993). A trial court abuses its discretion if 
its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness. State v. 
Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). Discretion is also abused 
if the actions of the judge are inherently unfair. State v. 
2 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). *[T]he denial of 
a motion for a mistrial does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion where no prejudice to the accused is shown." State v. 
Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah 1981). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permitting a 
previously undisclosed witness for the State to testify on 
rebuttal? 
A trial court's decision with respect to the testimony of a 
rebuttal witness will not be reversed "unless the appellant 
demonstrates that the trial court has clearly abused its 
discretion and thereby affected the appellant's substantial 
rights." Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
4. Did the trial court commit plain error by failing to 
view: 1) failure to pay the drug stamp tax as a lesser included 
offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute; and 2) reckless driving as a lesser included offense 
of failure to respond to an officer's signal? 
Because defendant did not preserve this issue in the trial 
court, he raises it for the first time on appeal as plain error. 
See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). 
5. Was the evidence adduced by the State sufficient to 
3 
support the jury's verdict of guilty for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute? 
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient 
evidence when the evidence is uso inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State 
v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting State v. 
Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other 
grounds bv State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
6. Did the trial court act within the limits of its 
discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences for 
the two second degree felonies of which he was convicted? 
An appellate court "does not disturb a sentence unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has 
abused its discretion." State v. Shelby. 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 
1986) . "An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of 
the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge 
imposed a 'clearly excessive sentence.'" State v. Russell. 791 
P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules will be cited in 
the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested and charged with six counts of 
criminal conduct, arising out of a high speed chase on 1-15 that 
resulted in the recovery of 26 grams of methamphetamine (R. 1, 
36-37, 451). Following a two-day jury trial, he was convicted as 
charged (R. 163-66). Defendant waived his time for sentencing 
(R. 762, 764). The trial court then sentenced him to: 
consecutive 1-15 year terms in the Utah State Prison on the two 
second degree felonies; two concurrent 0-5 year terms in prison 
on the two third degree felonies; and six months in jail with the 
remaining days stayed on the two misdemeanors (R. 775-78). This 
timely appeal followed (R. 167). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Near midnight on May 16, 1995, while working traffic 
enforcement, St. George police officer Matt Stoker saw a Honda 
"bullet bike" traveling east towards 1-15 (R. 326) . Executing a 
U-turn to follow the motorcycle, the officer saw one of the rear 
signal devices dangling, apparently broken (R. 327, 357, 360, 
473). When the motorcyclist failed to signal as he turned 
southbound onto the freeway, Officer Stoker activated his 
overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop (R. 327, 475). 
Defendant, who was operating the bullet bike, looked over 
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his shoulder at the officer and then accelerated to approximately 
80 or 90 miles an hour (R. 328) . Officer Stoker activated his 
siren to get defendant's attention and initially radioed dispatch 
that he was attempting to make a traffic stop. Soon thereafter, 
however, he reported that he was in hot pursuit (R. 329, 373, 
533-34). 
Officer Stoker testified that he saw defendant reach with 
his left hand behind his waist, pull something out, and drop it 
to the side of the road (R. 329, 419) . He testified that the 
object made sparks as it hit the ground, and that it landed off 
to the left in the median strip (R. 329, 3 95, 414). Stoker 
radioed dispatch that the motorcyclist had thrown a gun (R. 3 93). 
By this time, the chase had reached speeds of 90 to 110 
miles an hour (R. 330). Officer Stoker then saw defendant reach 
into a pouch on the right side of his waist, pull out a plastic 
bag, stand up on the pegs of the bike, and throw the bag straight 
over his head (R. 330) . The bag sailed over the police car (R. 
331). Shortly thereafter, defendant repeated the same action 
with another plastic bag (R. 331). 
The chase ended when defendant pulled over to the right, 
rode through a dirt median, and eventually ran into the front of 
Stoker's patrol vehicle which, by that time, was at a full stop 
6 
(R. 332-33, 434, 490, 517). The motorcycle fell over and 
defendant, agitated, approached Stoker, yelling, "Why did you hit 
me?" (R. 333, 341, 402-03) . Stoker and another officer who had 
come to the scene ordered defendant to the ground. When 
defendant failed to respond after repeated orders, Stoker sprayed 
mace in his face to subdue him (R. 341, 406, 433, 491, 518). 
Defendant was subsequently handcuffed and arrested (R. 342). 
Several officers soon began searching the area for evidence. 
They found a police scanner on the ground by the bike (R. 335). 
In the 1-15 travel lanes where Stoker had reported the first 
plastic bag thrown, they found pieces of hypodermic syringes (R. 
330, 343, 376). Just south of that area, they located a small 
plastic bag with white residue that later tested positive for 
methamphetamine (R. 346, 450). They also located a second, 
bigger baggie containing a large amount of white substance, later 
identified to be 26.3 grams of methamphetamine (R. 348-49, 382, 
451) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises six issues on appeal. First, he argues 
that the trial court should have compelled discovery of the hot 
pursuit policy of the St. George Police Department. The court 
properly ruled, however, that this information was not relevant 
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to any legal matter raised in this case. 
Second, defendant argues that the court abused its 
discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial, made when 1) 
the court permitted a defense witness, Kim Randall, to testify in 
prison clothing, and 2) the court, after a proffer, refused to 
allow Randall to be transported back to court to testify for a 
second time. Both of these rulings were reasonable, and neither 
prejudiced defendant. In the first instance, it is defendant, 
not his witness, who is granted the presumption of innocence and, 
consequently, cannot be compelled to appear in court in prison 
clothing. In the second instance, the court heard defendant's 
proffer and correctly determined that the evidence would be 
cumulative and repetitive. 
Third, defendant claims that the State violated his 
discovery request by failing to disclose its rebuttal witness, 
Kassi McArthur. He argues thait this non-disclosure prejudiced 
him because her testimony was outcome determinative, "but may not 
have been had the Appellant had time to prepare" (Br. of App. at 
19). This argument fails because the State only learned during 
opening statements that defendant would testify and did not know 
the precise contents of that testimony until defendant actually 
took the stand on the second day of trial. Thus, the State could 
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not have reasonably anticipated the testimony it would need to 
rebut. 
In any event, McArthur's testimony was not prejudicial. Her 
tendency to lie was revealed during her direct examination, when 
the State was compelled to refresh her recollection by 
confronting her with a statement she had previously given to the 
St. George Sheriff's Office. And on cross-examination, defense 
counsel made McArthur admit both her criminal involvement and the 
self-serving nature of her testimony. Finally, following her 
testimony, defense counsel called an additional witness to 
discredit McArthur. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the State 
should have disclosed its rebuttal witness, defendant suffered no 
actual prejudice. All his claim amounts to is a speculative 
possibility, far short of establishing a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result for him. 
Fifth, defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict that he was the individual who 
possessed the drugs that the police found on the highway. Given 
the testimony of the officer who was involved in the chase, 
however, as well as the corroborating dispatch tape, the jury had 
some evidence before it which, along with the reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence, supported the 
9 
verdict. 
Finally, defendant objects to the consecutive sentences that 
the trial court imposed for the two second degree felonies for 
which he was convicted. Defendant makes the novel argument that 
because he exercised his statutory right to waive time for 
sentencing, the court should be foreclosed from imposing 
consecutive sentences. This argument is frivolous on its face. 
Defendant himself waived the time for a presentence report and 
cannot now complain that the court sentenced him on the basis of 
inadequate information. In addition, even if a report had been 
prepared and had included a recommendation for concurrent 
sentences, the court would have been under no obligation to 
follow that recommendation. 
&RSUMENT 
£PINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
DISCOVERY OF THE "HOT PURSUIT" 
POLICY OF THE ST. GEORGE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT BECAUSE THE POLICY WAS 
IRRELEVANT TO THE LEGAL ISSUES IN 
THIS CASE 
In the trial court, defendant unsuccessfully sought to 
compel discovery of the St. George police department policy on 
"hot pursuit." He argued: 
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I may find in those policies . . . a 
violation of St. George City Police's 
policies, and if it is [sic], that would go 
to the credibility of the officer, and it 
would also lead me into an area of if he 
would violate that policy or that procedure, 
would he violate others in this investigation 
and arrest. 
(R. 786) . On appeal, defendant attempts to establish a nexus 
between policies governing hot pursuit and policies that might 
apply to searches and seizures (Br. of App. at 14-15). In 
essence, he argues that the court erred in denying his motion 
because an officer who would exceed the speed limit during a 
chase, thus violating departmental policy, would also be likely 
to conduct an unlawful search and seizure of evidence after the 
chase is over. 
The trial court disposed of defendant's argument on 
relevance grounds: 
The Court looks at the matter and determines 
it as follows: The existence of a speed 
limit cap on a fresh or hot pursuit policy of 
the St. George City Police Department, and 
whether or not such a cap was exceeded by the 
pursuing officer in this matter -- and I take 
specific notice that I was the judge who 
heard the preliminary hearing in this matter 
and listened to the testimony carefully and 
have that testimony clearly in mind at this 
time -- the Court's determination is that 
whether or not that officer at the time 
either intentionally or inadvertently 
determined to violate that cap is wholly and 
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entirely collateral to the issues of this 
case. 
I do not find that there is a significant 
connection for relevamce terms between that 
policy and the actions of the officer and the 
credibility of the officer under this case 
under the circumstances that the officer was, 
in fact, in hot pursuit behind a vehicle that 
was not responding to his signal to stop, 
that the officer observed items being thrown 
from that vehicle and testified as such, and 
I see no causal connection. Based upon that, 
I deny your discovery motion. 
(R. 787-88). 
The trial court's ruling comes within the ambit of rule 16 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which confers upon the 
court the discretion to deny discovery. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
16(e). In this instance, the court simply determined that the 
requested policy was not relevant to any legal issue before the 
court.1 Because this determination is well within the "broad 
discretion'' permitted trial courts in refusing discovery, it 
should not be disturbed on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Knill. 656 
P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah 1982). 
1
 This appeal raises no search or seizure issues, 
12 
PQINT VfJQ 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE 
LIMITS OF ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL 
Defendant moved twice for a mistrial, both times in 
connection with the testimony of Kim Randall, a defense witness 
incarcerated in the Kane County Jail at the time of trial (R. 
112-13, 114-15). First, defendant sought a mistrial when the 
court permitted Randall, on the first day of trial, to testify 
before the jury while wearing prison clothes (R. 463). Second, 
defendant moved for a mistrial when, on the second day, following 
a proffer, the court refused to recall Randall from jail to 
testify again (R. 679) . 
In reviewing a decision to deny a motion for a mistrial, a 
reviewing court grants the trial court a "great deal" of 
discretion, disturbing its determination only if the decision is 
beyond the limits of reasonableness or inherently unfair. Pena. 
869 P.2d at 938/ Ql£SH, 860 P.2d at 334; Eaillirei, 817 P.2d at 
781-82 n.3. u[T]he denial of a motion for a mistrial does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion where no prejudice to the 
accused is shown." Workman. 635 P.2d at 53. In this case, the 
trial court's two determinations, when viewed in the context of 
the trial as a whole, fell well within the limits of its 
13 
discretion. 
1. The trial court's decision to permit Kim Randall, a 
witness for defendant, to testify in prison clothing 
was reasonable 
Defendant recognizes that it is the accused who must not be 
compelled to stand trial before a jury while dressed in 
identifiable prison clothing (Br. of App. at 21). The gist of 
his argument is that this right wshould be extended to witnesses 
for the Defendant" (Id.).2 Where, as here, defendant has failed 
to support his argument with any legal analysis or authority, a 
reviewing court may decline to rule on it. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Even on the merits, however, defendant's proposition fails. 
It is axiomatic that every accused person is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty. Consequently, w[t]o implement the 
presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine 
the fairness of the fact-finding process." Estelle v, Williams, 
425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). For a defendant to be compelled to 
2
 Defendant argues that n[f]or the Defendant to have a 
witness testify in shackles and jail overalls is probably the 
same as not having a witness at all" (Br. of App. at 21) . This 
argument is severely undercut by the fact that the State's 
rebuttal witness, Kassi McArthur, whom defendant complains 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial, also testified in prison 
clothing. 
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appear before ? 4 ir. prison clothing constitutes one such 
f ac t : i n I'lt'cJi j ,|i ""in utjiibLciiin. leiriiiiKJeii oi, t r ie a c c u s e d ' s 
condition," id,,,, at 504. The defendant's clothing is so likely 
to be a continuing I nfluence throughout the trial \ ha I .in 
u n a c c e p t a b 1 e r i s k i ,<• i p r e s e 1i1; e 11 i > I 1111 \ i <L I 11111 s n i h 1 e 1" a c 1", o i s «, • tj> 111111 g 
into play," ][ d »,„ at 505 (citations omitted) . 
Howe M e:i : , t:l lis o :: n ipelli ng rationale, protection of the 
presumption of innocence accruing to an accused ••. i mp".l ,/ d o o s m , »l 
apply to defendant'- vitn-??^ (or, for that matter, to the State's 
reh- ppearaiioe \\\ i del eiist > ix l ness attired 
in prison clothes dc-.-s :;;;_, of course, adversely affect the 
presumption of innocence or carry with it the inference that the 
defendant is a person disport «i 1 •• iinii " L eopln ^ 
Froehlig. 1 Cal. Rptn , 2d 858, 860 (Cal. Ct. App, 1991J ; cf. 
E£J2J^^ " JU ' " '" I'pL-i • 'li-J. '1 ' K.il. rt App 
1984] l finding presumption vi innocence rationale "mapp.1 i c. ihl e 
where an independent witness, not charged wit;,}} responsibility for 
the crime nor shown ' *»«? 'i'liuf in concei.r II i- < IH.^nd.niL, 
is the one who Is shackled I Although r. he credibility of a 
ppc 3t»ii «jdil:) may be more suspect, "the 
prejudici-* impact upon the defense is considered V] ess 
consequenti '" Id, , ; cf. People v. Allen. 729 P. 2d 115, 140 
15 
(Cal. 1986), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 872 (1987) (*[T]he 
prejudicial effect of shackling defense witnesses is less 
consequential since 'the shackled witness . . . [does] not 
directly affect the presumption of innocence.'") (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, the court took extra precautions to ensure 
that Kim Randall's testimony would not be diminished because he 
appeared in prison garb. First, the court swore the witness in 
and seated him in the witness box before the jury returned to the 
courtroom (R. 461). Thus, his slippers and shackles were not 
visible to the jury. See id. at 139-40 (finding it significant 
that there was no evidence any of the jurors saw shackles on 
witness). For the same reason, the witness left the courtroom 
only after the jurors had left (R. 482-83). Second, prior to 
Randall's testimony, the court gave the jury a cautionary 
instruction to remind them of their duty to evaluate each witness 
individually.3 Under these circumstances, where the witness had 
3
 The Court instructed the jury: 
The person seated in the witness chair right 
now is Mr. Kim Randall. Mr. Randall 
presently resides in the Kane County Jail and 
is here from that facility to testify in this 
matter. You can see that Mr. Randall is 
dressed in orange clothing, but that is 
16 
nil in in 1111 in in iji a p p ;.:>J2 .in civ Lliaii c l o t h i n g a n d w h e r e t h e c o u r t 
minimized any adverse ^ 'irv 
the trial court's decision to have the witnej- Lost.: ^ • L1 
garb was neiti :ie n beyond tl le limits of reasonableness nor 
inherently unfair.4 . . 
Consequently, because defendant failed to show how Kim 
Randall ' r 1 >• \\ i f MI i | i i m J n Innj i > L e j uJictsd the outcome of 
consistent with his present residence and 
cnly with his residence. Mr, Randall has • ••' 
been accused of criminal violations, b1 f he 
is presumed innocent just as Mr Souza is 
p re s ume d innocent. 
Mr*, Randall, even though he is in custody at 
this time, should be given the same attention 
and you should apply the same rules that the 
Court has previously given to you Irir -judging 
the credibility of witnesses. 
Let me point out specifically arid i i istruct 
you specifically that the fact that Mr. 
Randall is presently residing in r; > Kane 
County Jail, that he is dressed in jrange 
clothing, as you can see, should be taken by 
you as absolutely no evidence, • id verse-
inference should be drawn from that a. n v.! J. '. 
should not be used as any indication, one way 
er the otherf with respect to Mn<=- •-••^i-1 ^ty 
Randa 1.1' s test imony. 
;-.•;:.. ly, the cc, nut: did not give an analogous cautionar y 
instruction prior to the testimony of Kassi McArthur, the state's 
rebuttal witness. 
1 1 
the case, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's first motion for a mistrial. 
.2. The trial court's refusal to recall Kim Randall to 
testify QH the second day of trial was justified, 
Defendant made his second motion for a mistrial when the 
trial court, after a proffer, refused to recall Kim Randall to 
testify for a second time (R. 679). Defendant contends that the 
court's denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion 
and that this error, in combination with others, rendered his 
trial inherently unfair (Br. of App. at 22). When considered in 
context, however, the reasonableness of the court's ruling 
becomes apparent. 
Prior to trial, in response to defendant's ex parte motion, 
the court issued a transportation order for Kim Randall to be 
brought from the Kane County Jail to Fifth District Court by 1:30 
p.m. on the first day of trial (R. 112-13, 114-15). The order 
further stated that Randall was to be kept at the Washington 
County jail until the close of trial (R. 115). Late in the 
afternoon on the first day of trial, after one of the State's 
witnesses finished testifying, the court announced: 
Members of the jury, at this juncture in the 
lawsuit, we are going to call a witness out 
of order for the convenience of the person 
not involved with the trial. We will call a 
18 
:
-- witness out of order. This is a defense 
witness asked by Mr. Scarth. Ordinarily, you 
wouldn't be hearing from defense witnesses in 
• the middle of the prosecution,' s case, but 
. . counsel have agreed that this may be done out 
of order, and we will next ca] 1 Mr Kim,, 
Randall. 
(~ 4S7-5?' ""ie cc .r: then called a short . ^ cess. 
S— s- \ nresence ^f defense counsel 
thanked the r*y^~ :c. allowing iu.iu txiue L U ; " ru:lal I , 
stating that he and defendant "have had sufficient time to 
interview him W • I I I IMI I111. l.'j.il mi ny i'j HULL;-I. i.al ULL ) • 
V ti'nJ.-'l 1 then testified on direct, and the prosecutor cross-
examined I i i, in. 
On the second day of trial, the defense presented ,i i c use." 
Defendant testified, followed by three other defense witnesses. 
- . . . . , . . -owiry . ~~ ^ 
second , 673J . When xL became apparent that Randal I 
n.z present, the court, out of the presence of the ji iry, sta#ed: 
Counsel, before you make whatever 
determinations you want to do about Mr. 
Randall's lack of presence, I recall that we 
called Mr. Randall out of order in the middle 
of the State's case in order to take his 
testimony. Now, I thought we had it all 
done, and I can see why he may have gone t -rk 
[to the Kane County Jail], but we did call 
him out of order specifically for f hat 
purpose„ 
IS 
(R. 673). Shortly thereafter, a conversation between the court 
and counsel revealed a disagreement as to why Randall had been 
called out of order,5 Without resolving the matter, the court 
then requested a proffer of what Randall would testify to if 
recalled (See addendum A). After the proffer, the court found 
"that that evidence is repetitive, cumulative, has already been 
addressed by other competent testimony, that it is unnecessary at 
this point," accepted the proffer, and denied defendant's request 
to recall Mr. Randall (R. 679). Defendant then moved for a 
mistrial, and the court denied the motion (R. 679-80). 
5
 The following exchange between the court and the parties 
outlines the difference of opinion: 
The Court: Mr. Randall was called out of order 
at your request. 
D. Counsel: No, at the Court's request. 
Prosecutor: I don't believe that's correct, your 
honor. 
D. Counsel: The Court asked us to approach the 
bench. The Court led a discussion with 
[the prosecutor] and myself and made the 
suggestion that he be called out of 
order. 
The Court: Because Mr. Randall was in custody at 
the time. 
Prosecutor: Along with the State's expert. 
The Court: My recollection is that Mr. Randall and 
Mr. Gerlits were both competing for a 
narrow time slot. 
(R. 677-78). 
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On appeal, defendant does not: contest the court's ruling 
tlidt. the evidence pi offered was repetitive, but rather that the 
request for a proffer caucrht, linn " I'll quaifd' «,:niKii rtut, 
consequently, he, "was not able to articulate the full range of 
q -~s - >.| I I ici I I ii'ii'i 111 .Jiiiii in 111 ] u n a s k i n g r h e w i t n e s s . " ( B r . o f 
" 11| i I'Jt 2 2 ) . He further argues wthe answers to questions c 
direct testimony couI ,1 have elicited questions beyond those 
stated to the court h i-num^l" (Pi 11 ' x . 
Defense counsel here finds himself in • ,.*- uncomfortable 
: •? . £e:in r, * .^1^^111 realizing 
belatedly thai _e *«i*. questions unasked ana 
Counsel's own, omissions or failure to argue his case 
persuaf"."- , . .- no an abuse 
of discretion . ;.•&;£ v. Perry *~J~, *.*^*, (Utah 
rt .. - . - - .a»j...;j .ic=:fecti"e i r s ; s c a r ce of 
c o u n s e l c l a i m s , r e v i e w i n g c o u r t s must ileffi il rnuri'ie I1 • li i c e s 
r e g a r d i n g t r i a l s t r a t e g y , even i f in h i n d s i g h t h i s or h e r c h o i c e s 
were *i n r o r i PC ) nr i i i i l inns f m\ \ r r rr\ I Whon, \\-i h e r e r t h e 
p r e f e r r e d t e s t i m o n y was r e p e t i t i v e and had no o b v i o u s r e l e v a n c e 
' . .sues, an 1 wli. LU d,.it.,jndant lias no t e x p l a i n e d how t h e 
a b s e n c e of t h e p r e f e r r e d t e s t imony pupjurli rni 1 il he I HIJ! CCHHP il il lie 
c a s e f o r him, t h e t r i \l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s h o u l d r ema in u n d i s t u r b e d . 
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State y, workman. 635 p.2d at 53. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED 
A PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED REBUTTAL 
WITNESS FOR THE STATE TO TESTIFY 
WHERE THE NEED FOR HER TESTIMONY 
BECAME APPARENT ONLY AFTER THE 
TRIAL HAD BEGUN 
The gist of defendant's complaint is that the State violated 
its discovery request by failing to disclose Kassi McArthur as a 
rebuttal witness.6 This non-disclosure, argues defendant, 
prejudiced him because wit is highly likely that McArthur7s 
testimony was outcome determinative . . . but may not have been 
had the Appellant had time to prepare" (Br. of App. at 19).7 
6
 While defendant also complains that the statement 
McArthur gave to the Washington County Sheriff's Office was not 
disclosed to him prior to trial, he does not raise this as a 
separate issue, choosing rather to primarily focus on the State's 
failure to disclose Kassi McArthur as a rebuttal witness. In any 
event, he received the statement during trial and admits that he 
was able to use the document to cross-examine McArthur (Br. of 
App. at 19). 
7
 He also argues that the court denied him his right to a 
fair trial by: 1) not granting his motion for a mistrial; and 2) 
not continuing the trial sua sponte to allow him time to prepare 
for McArthur's testimony (Br. of App. at 18). As to the first 
contention, the record reveals that he never moved for a mistrial 
on this issue. As to the second contention, the burden rests 
with defendant, not the court, to seek a continuance for 
preparation time. See State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah 1988); State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 1987). 
22 
Disclosure of rebuttal witnesses is governed by "whether the 
anticipated prior *-.*_. Turner v. Nelson. <*#* P.2d ±u2i, 
1 ... v. *. .wns o^it-ec?^ ; accord StatS-Ei Tennyson, 
850 r.-iQ it * i 
trial court in making this determination because the trial court 
x
 ii"i,iJc-11(„<r> betoivi it: and was in the best position to 
determine whether [the state] could reasonab] y have anti ci pated 
[defendant's] testimony " Turner, H7? F 2d at 1024. 
H^ 'i: e, ! I hi illpfemse c o u n s e l jnd I he SLdt e iiiuvecl tor 
disclosure of each oiher's witnesses, pursuant to rule 16 of the 
L^i _. ~ .-.",*.* . -. ,_^_ Q-tr\\ 8 wh:He ^hr: State 
complied with the ieq^ ' -"
 : 
the State' i *s- ; r.ier ^rcri ,• ntains no evidence that 
defendant compl i e ::i wi til: i t::]ll: le i: eq uest. Consequently, only when the 
trial began and defense counsel made his opening statement cli ci 
the State even learn that defendant planned K? testify '- -19, 
3 20). *uiu - •" " " - . 1 
8
 The State is 'moving to supplement the record on appeal 
with its Request for Discovery, dated October 3, 1 995. ''•'•" 
\ Jhile no .record evidence attests to the contents oi ..«= 
State's response, the State does not disagree with defendant's 
representation that McArthur was not 1 isted. 
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defendant took the witness stand on the second day of trial, 
explaining in detail that he was throwing cans of beer from his 
motorcycle during the chase. Only at this juncture did the State 
know that it would need to call defendant's girlfriend, Kassi 
McArthur to rebut defendant's version of what happened.10 
When McArthur took the stand, she testified that defendant 
told her he threw methamphetamine from the bike, that he asked 
her to tell the police that he had not thrown anything, and that 
he did not threaten her in any way. Since this testimony was in 
part contrary to what McArthur had earlier told the police, the 
State then introduced a police report from the Washington County 
Sheriff's Office to refresh her recollection (R. 688). 
Under the circumstances, then, since the State knew neither 
defendant's theory of the case nor whether defendant would 
testify, it could not have anticipated the need to call McArthur 
as a witness. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 472-73 (Utah 
App. 1993)(undisclosed rebuttal witness permitted where State, in 
good faith, had no reason to expect need for such witness). 
10
 The State had moved, prior to trial, for McArthur to be 
transported from the Utah State Prison to the Washington County 
jail, presumably so she would be readily available if needed (R. 
106-07). Plainly, however, if defendant had not testified, there 
would have been no need for her to testify in rebuttal. 
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In any event, the testimony offered, by Kassi McArthur was 
unlikely to have prejudiced defendant for severa1 —•**•—is. 
First w I in ill i M w pl -Hi i In M i d llrst imony hi in McArlhin tJ: lat • 
rebutted defendant's story, it also impeached hei by showing that 
she waiJ i>inj I I.I Mn lury about whethei deteiidanL Llireatened 1 ler. 
That is, she first testified that defendant simp] y asked hex to 
lie to the jury, denying that he threatened her (R, 687). When 
the State confronted I: le i: I 
Washinator C:;u;:iu Sri-iiiff's C:tiize, however, she -idnLitced that 
deran-iar.;. . . ^«*» mr^r** hreater. her* 
[0] rie aignu ne JI.J ;; -.-: rue ,. :.. .a:'.*.. 
lot of my apartment because he hart been • he 
A..itei Tie o sa\ :' * r:e .\:p ^ r 
behind me ;:o see hi~ rr.r:w anything, ana . 
told him T wouldn't. And le r&i? ' ^ z ing 
(R, 690). In addition, defense counsel cross-examined McArthur • 
e f £ e c t: i i- e 1 y , c a u s i i I g h e i: t :: a dm i t: t h a t s h e w a s i n prison f o r 
violating parole for a crime of dishonesty and that she was 
testifying in order to lessen her own pending sentencing on a 
f -"* . i A t:i ( i: ( R 6 9 3 , 7 0 3 ) •' ' • . •• • • 
;. -irigate any possible prejudicial effect of 
McArthur , _ . r ana . chur's 
incriminating statements, defense counsel called Peggy 
McReynolds, defendant's mother, as a final witness (R. 710). 
McReynolds testified that McArthur was a scorned lover of 
defendant's, bitter about defendant's engagement to McArthur's 
closest friend (R. 711). She testified: *[McArthur] called my 
house. She called my son's house, my other son. She said she 
was going to get back with Kenny if it was the last thing she 
did, that nobody was going to dump her" (R. 711). 
Finally, while defense counsel claimed surprise and failure 
to provide discovery when the State called Kassi McArthur, he 
never asked for a continuance or, as he asserts in his brief, for 
a mistrial. Indeed, no plea for specific relief appears anywhere 
in the record. Even now, on appeal, he argues only that more 
time might have allowed him to better prepare for McArthur's 
testimony. Where, as here, however, he effectively impeached her 
testimony, it is hard to imagine what else defense counsel might 
have done. 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the State should have 
disclosed McArthur as a rebuttal witness, defendant suffered no 
prejudice. £££ State V. Knigh£, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) 
("Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
[defendant's] motions . . . depends entirely upon a determination 
of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce the requested 
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information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal 
i inder Rule 3 0 [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] "x 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant. 
Consequently , the tri a] court* s decision should be affirmed M,,,,, 
POINT FOUR 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, FAILURE TO PAY 
THE DRUG STAMP TAX IS NOT A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE AND RECKLESS DRIVING IS 
NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S 
SIGNAL 
Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that failure 
t.1.1 | lie < I r 11*1 -J fiiiip tax is a lesser included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
r -.;- ^..«^::^ . . „ asser i. . . „. . ::ense of .....re 
to respond to a.a officer's signax vBi . yt ? . au 2J-27J . io 
prevail under such circumstances, defendant must establish three 
elements II) llul HI n'mr ni.'ivn nvrl; (,') M M I l IIP r-rror wnn 
obvious; and (3) that: the error was harmful. State v. Dunn. 850 
P.2d 1201, 12UU lUUh l'JUJ), State v. Ellifritz. fc|j';, l\ 2d 1/0, 
174 (Utah App. ii^i/ . If any one of these elements is missing, 
o7 
plain error cannot be found, fiunn* 850 P.2d at 1209. In this 
case, the analysis need not go beyond the first element. 
Section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code prevents a defendant 
from being convicted of two offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode when one offense is a lesser included offense of 
the other. fi££ Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a) (1995) . * [A] n 
offense is lesser included when proof of one crime necessarily 
proves all of the elements of the second crime." State v. 
EXQfikS, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). Utah 
courts use a two-part test for making this determination. Id. 
(citing State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). First, the 
court engages in ua purely theoretical comparison" of the 
statutory elements of the two crimes to assess whether proof of 
the more serious offense will necessarily always satisfy the 
elements of the lesser offense. Usually, this comparison 
resolves the controversy. Id. If, however, the statute defines 
a crime by listing variations in the elements, the court must 
take the second analytical step. It must examine the facts of 
the particular case to determine which statutory variation was 
proved and whether, in fact, a lesser included relationship 
exists between the two crimes. Id. 
In this case, the "purely theoretical comparison" required 
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t i I 1 1 1 u.i I n . I Finn I f i r , i n i i i i i I i i d g h - j i f ) f f f^\) c j p g 
ciearlv reveals that failure to pay the drug stamp tax is not a 
lessci Ui^x^ed uttense ui possession of a controlled substance 
with intent LU distribute, MM it •; f ir-n i hr rrime of failure I 
pay the drug stamp tax requires that the accused, a "dealer," did 
not j: c .5 !::l: :ii = , I J-- HI I In ilr ugs ^.y III: ah Code Aiui k Vj-
19-106(2) (1996), .Plainly, this tax and revenue provision is not 
an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance 
1 id t:J: ] :! 1: i t 2nt t> ::: • ::i i s t r . eixient s • if I li. a 
more serious crime, possession of a control] sd substance with 
inte..* .. .ibute, cannot prove all the elements of the lesser 
crime, failure co pay the drug stamp tax. Applying the first 
step .:f the Brooks araV/sis tl-.er.. ;eveals * ~ r *ta" fla* '. 
Defendant's second assertion, that ^eck^ess dri/irg _s a 
lesser included offense of failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop, requires a more extensive analysis. Fi rst, 
failure to respond to an officer's signal includes two 
vara at :i :i)r:i s 'I '• ::: • fc e g i :i :i "I t:::.;; ::: i: tl: :i :i s o f f e n s e a fill 1: i ei: ni: iiiist 
initially receive a signal from an officer to stop and then 
either 1 ) operate hi s vehicle to interfere with operation,, of any 
ol'hfM 'mhir-li' ui 1 ndanqer any | ipr sum ni ijhi 11- 1 1 'I 1! t eni| il il 1 
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flee or elude the officer. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
13.5(1) (1996); State v. Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah App. 
1995). Depending on which variation applies, the completed 
offense may or may not include the elements of reckless driving. 
The second step of the Brooks test directs that, under such 
circumstances, *[t]he court must look at the evidence actually 
presented at trial to determine which of the statutory variations 
were proved and whether those variations created a lesser 
included relationship between the crimes." Brooks. 908 P.2d at 
861 (citing Hill. 674 P.2d at 97). If there are sufficient 
independent grounds, even though they arise out of one criminal 
episode, defendant may be convicted of both offenses. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1996); State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 
89-90 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v, 
Mirguet. 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2; State v, Shaffer, 725 p.2d 
1301, 1314 n.3 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, evidence was adduced at trial to prove that 
defendant received a signal to stop and then attempted to flee or 
elude the officer (R. 327, 328, 533-34). This crime was 
completed as soon as defendant made the turn onto 1-15, looked 
back over his shoulder, and then accelerated (R. 328). The 
additional crime of reckless driving consisted of the chase that 
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ensued, covering more than two miles and reaching speeds of close 
to 100 miles per hour (R. 330, 336) . Where, as here, separate 
elements established the two crimes independently, reckless 
driving is not a lesser included offense of failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop. See Wood. 868 P.2d at 89-90; 
Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1314 n.3. 
Because defendant has raised these claims on appeal as plain 
error but has not demonstrated that the trial court committed any 
error, let alone an obvious and prejudicial error, his lesser 
included offense argument must fail, 
POINT FIVE 
CONSIDERING BOTH THE FACTS AND THE 
INFERENCES THAT MAY REASONABLY BE 
DRAWN FROM THOSE FACTS, THE JURY 
HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF POSSESSION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT 
TO DISTRIBUTE 
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient 
to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute- Specifically, he complains of the 
paucity of direct evidence tying him to the significant quantity 
of methamphetamine found on the highway (Br. of App. at 28-29). 
To support his argument, he highlights testimony from Officer 
Staley on cross-examination, confirming that 1-15 as it connects 
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to 1-70 is known as a pipeline for illegal substances (R. 531). 
He also contends that Officer Stoker's testimony about where the 
baggie containing 26.3 grams of methamphetamine was found fails 
to match up precisely with where he reported objects being thrown 
from the motorcycle (Br. of App. at 28). 
At the outset, a jury's verdict will not be reversed because 
the jury failed to preclude all other possible explanations for 
the presence of the contraband on the highway, as defendant 
suggests with his "pipeline" theory. See, e.g.. State v. 
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993) (stating appellate court 
will affirm if, during its review, it finds "some evidence or 
inferences upon which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made") (emphasis added) (citing State 
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). Rather, in order to 
reverse a criminal conviction based on a jury verdict for 
insufficient evidence, this Court must determine that the 
evidence was "so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that 
the defendant committed the crime." State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 
at 543. This is a high standard, mandating that a jury's verdict 
remain undisturbed "so long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences" support the jury's decision. State v. Moore. 802 
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P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990). 
Here, evidence amply supported the jury's conclusion that 
defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. 
Officer Stoker testified that he saw three objects thrown from 
the motorcycle while defendant fled south on 1-15. First, he saw 
defendant release what appeared to be a handgun (R. 329, 368, 
3 93, 3 94). Next, he saw defendant reach behind his waist, pull 
out a plastic bag, and throw it over his head (R. 330) . Finally, 
as defendant neared the south offramp of the highway, Stoker saw 
him repeat the same motion, throwing a second plastic baggie over 
his head (R. 331). 
Once the chase was over and defendant was secured, Officer 
Stoker, along with others, searched the area for evidence.11 
Near where he had seen defendant throw the first baggie, Officer 
Stoker "found several pieces of hypodermic syringes, and they 
were scattered throughout the median, in the freeway, itself, in 
the travel -- both travel lanes, and on both sides of the 
freeway'' (R. 343) . In the area where he saw the second bag 
thrown, "going southbound from 400 East . . . in the outside lane 
11
 The search was facilitated by a local ambulance driver 
who showed up and loaned the officers a hand-held spotlight (R. 
378) . 
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closest to the median,'' the officer found a small bag with white 
residue in it (R. 346) . He also located, uon the southbound 
lanes on the west side of the freeway . . . in the emergency lane 
in the area of where the grooves are cut, if you get too far over 
it makes a sound," a large quantity of methamphetamine, with an 
estimated street value of $2600 (R. 348, 485). 
That the large quantity of methamphetamine may not have been 
found precisely where the officer saw a baggie thrown is not 
dispositive, as defendant suggests (Br. of App. at 28). The 
vehicles, according to defendant himself, were traveling at up to 
90 miles an hour (R. 555). Certainly, when traveling at that 
rate of speed, it would be difficult to judge precisely where any 
thrown item would either initially land or ultimately come to 
rest.12 
Given this testimony, confirmed with a recorded audio tape 
of the officer's on-going communication with police dispatch, a 
12
 In addition, the jury also heard testimony from Kim 
Randall, defendant's employer at the time, who stated that he 
followed defendant onto the highway as the chase began (R. 474-
75). Kassi McArthur, a girlfriend of defendant's, testified that 
she, too, was on 1-15 in the area of the chase on the night in 
question (R. 686) . While neither witness testified that they 
stopped, the jury knew they had been in the immediate vicinity 
and could conceivably have had access to the evidence defendant 
threw from the bike. 
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jury could reasonably infer that it was defendant who threw the 
items found on the freeway in order to rid himself of 
incriminating evidence. Because the record testimony and the 
inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that testimony 
support the conclusion that defendant was the individual who 
possessed the methamphetamine found on the highway after the 
chase, the jury's verdict should remain undisturbed. Moore. 802 
P.2d at 738. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE 
LIMITS OF ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES FOR THE TWO SECOND DEGREE 
FELONIES OF WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED 
An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed by a 
trial court unless the sentence exceeds the limits prescribed by 
law or unless the court abuses its discretion in imposing that 
sentence. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986) (citing 
State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)). In this case, 
because the trial court had statutory authority pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) to impose consecutive sentences, the only 
remaining question is whether the court abused its discretion by 
so doing. 
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in two 
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ways: first, by not insisting on a presentence report and, 
instead, honoring defendant's waiver of the time for sentencing 
and, second, by sentencing him to consecutive sentences without 
the benefit of a presentence report (Br. of App. at 32). In 
essence, defendant argues that he was unfairly sentenced to 
consecutive sentences because the judge knew nothing about him. 
His argument resolves itself into a novel rule: that when a 
defendant refuses to allow time for preparation of a presentence 
report, the court should be limited to imposing concurrent 
sentences. 
This "rule" plainly makes no sense. First, it was defendant 
himself who waived the presentence report. See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1(5) (a) (1995 & Supp. 1996) (allowing the court to continue 
the date of sentencing, "with the concurrence of the defendant," 
in order to obtain a presentence investigation report or other 
information about defendant). Defendant did not take this action 
lightly. Indeed, the court explained at length why allowing time 
for a presentence report would accrue to his benefit: 
I will request your wish to waive time for 
sentencing and impose sentence at this point, 
but let me at least give you the benefit of 
my observations before I do so. 
As you well know, the matters before the 
Court are serious. Each of them carry 1 to 
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15 years incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison, and that is by legislative 
determination. Without further information, 
with only the bold record of the facts and 
circumstances that I have heard during trial, 
I am given little, if any opportunity to more 
carefully review this matter. 
My contact with you throughout the months 
that this case and other matters have been 
pending is such that I believe you are a man 
of substantial intelligence, substantial 
insight, frankly, a very personable 
individual separate and apart from this 
criminal conduct. 
I guess what I'm saying is that you may have 
done bad things, but that doesn't make you a 
bad person. 
I may not have the ability to do much other 
than impose the sentence. If you wish me to 
do so, and it is my job and my duty and I 
will so that if it is your request, but I 
would be remiss if I told you that I would 
not also benefit from a presentence report. 
It's up to you, sir, though. If you wish to 
waive the time for sentencing, I will proceed 
if that is your desire. 
(R. 763-64) . Defendant then exercised his statutory right and 
waived time for sentencing (R. 764). Under the circumstances, 
where the court plainly wanted a presentence report and defendant 
refused, he cannot now argue that the court should have ignored 
his choice and ordered the report anyway. Cf. State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 
37 
(1990) (if a party leads the trial court into error, a reviewing 
court will not save that party from the error). 
Second, defendant has not shown or even suggested that the 
court would have imposed a more lenient sentence had it reviewed 
a presentence report.13 Indeed, the most likely implication from 
defendant's refusal to allow time for a report is that he 
believed additional information about his criminal past would 
only lead the court to sentence him more harshly. And, finally, 
even if a presentence report had been prepared, the court would 
have been "no more bound by that recommendation that it was by 
the State's, the alienists', or the defendant's." State v. 
13
 Although defendant may have hoped to receive a more 
lenient sentence by waiving the presentence report, surprise or 
disappointment in the severity of his sentence is not grounds for 
reversal. Cf. State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976) 
("[A] mere subjective belief of a defendant as to potential 
sentence, or hope of leniency, unsupported by an promise from the 
prosecutor indication by the court, is insufficient to invalidate 
a guilty plea"),- accord State v. Hansen/ 627 p.2d 53, 55 (Utah 
1981) (To allow defendant's mere hope or belief to invalidate a 
guilty plea "would virtually require the granting of such a 
motion in every case where the defendant is not satisfied with 
the sentence the court determines to impose."). Similarly, if 
this Court disturbs the sentence imposed by the trial court, it 
is opening the door for future defendants to waive the time for 
preparing a presentence report and then, later, to complain about 
the severity of their sentence. 
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Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) .14 
Because the evidence before this Court confirms that the 
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was reasonable 
under the circumstances presented by this case, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's determination. See State v. Hamilton. 
827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)(citing State v. Ramirez. 817 
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991)). 
. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / H day of November, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
14
 The Utah Supreme Court has also consistently recognized 
that a trial court "has very wide discretion in sentencing." 
State v. Lipsky. 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980); accord State v. 
Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984). 
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1 he be called out of order. 
2 THE COURT: Because Mr. Randall was in 
3 custody at the time. 
4 MR. LUDLOW: Along with the State's 
5 expert. 
6 THE COURT: My recollection is that Mr. 
7 Randall and Mr. Gerlits were both competing for a 
8 narrow time slot. What is your proffer of testimony 
9 if Mr. Randall were called, counsel? What would you 
10 have him testify to? 
11 MR. SCARTH: Okay. I'll give that 
12 proffer, Your Honor. I proffer that if Mr. Kim 
13 Randall were recalled as witness for the defense 
14 that he would testify that the scanner, which has 
15 been received in evidence as an item taken into 
16 evidence by the officers at the scene of the arrest, 
17 was, when he last saw it, being Kim Randall, he last 
18 saw it at the Taco Bell that it was attached to the 
19 bullet bike motorcycle of Mr. Souza. 
20 He would also testify that as he drove 
21 past the location of the stop of this motorcycle on 
22 1-15 proceeding south that the motorcycle was laying 
23 right next to 1-15 only a foot or two from the paved 
24 surface and that the distance between the overturned 
25 motorcycle and the police patrol car was no more 
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1 than three feet. 
2 He would testify that that night he did 
3 not communicate with Kenneth Souza after Mr. Souza 
4 left the Taco Bell on St. George Boulevard. He did 
5 not have another discussion with him, by any means, 
6 until 8 or after 8 a.m. the morning of the 17th of 
.7 May, 1995. 
8 He would testify that that morning when he 
9 saw Kenneth Souza that he observed that on the right 
10 side of his head he had a lump and the skin was 
11 broken. 
12 He would testify that when Kenneth Souza 
13 left him at the Taco Bell on St. George Boulevard 
14 that he knew that Kenneth Souza had a camera in the 
15 black pouch that was received into evidence. 
16 THE COURT: All right, counsel. The Court 
17 finds that that evidence is repetitive, cumulative, 
18 has already been addressed by other competent 
19 testimony, that it is unnecessary at this point. 
20 Your proffer is made. Your request to recall Mr. 
21 Randall is denied. Any further record you need to 
22 make other than that is over your vociferous 
23 objection? 
24 MR.. SCARTH: I move for a mistrial on the 
25 basis that we have been denied to this witness, been 
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